is supported by the great weight of decision. *Wood* v. *American Fire Ins. Co.*, 149 N. Y. 382, 44 N. E. 80; *Stephens* v. *Illinois Mutual Fire Ins. Co.*, 43 Ill. 327.

INTERSTATE COMMERCE — CONTROL BY CONGRESS — FEDERAL STATUTE AGAINST SHIPPING LIQUOR INTO STATES WHICH PROHIBIT ITS MANUFACTURE AND SALE. — A federal statute prohibits the shipment of intoxicating liquor into states which prohibit its manufacture and sale (39 STAT. L. 1069). Defendant was convicted under this statute for carrying intoxicating liquor for his personal use from Kentucky into West Virginia, which prohibited the manufacture and sale of liquor but did not prohibit its importation for personal use. *Held*, that the statute was not unconstitutional. *United States* v. *Hill*, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 143.

The power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce is limited only by the constitution of the United States. *Hipolite Egg Co.* v. *United States*, 220 U. S. 45. It extends to absolute prohibition. *Lottery Case*, 188 U. S. 321. Means may be adopted for its exercise that have the quality of police regulations, even though the states have police power over the same subject within their boundaries. *Hoke* v. *United States*, 227 U. S. 308. The statute is therefore constitutional unless it involves such an unreasonable and arbitrary discrimination between states as to constitute a denial of due process of law. A statute prohibiting the sale of liquor to Indians for a limited time after they had lost the character of tribal Indians has been held a reasonable exercise of the power to regulate commerce with the Indian tribes. *Dick* v. *United States*, 208 U. S. 340. And likewise a statute prohibiting the sale of liquor in a portion of a state inhabited partially by tribal Indians. *Ex parte Webb*, 225 U. S. 663. A statute taxing corporations has been held not an arbitrary discrimination between classes of persons. *Corporation Tax Cases*, 220 U. S. 107. The principal case goes slightly further than these, as the statute goes beyond the state policy which is the basis for the distinction, but this basis is nevertheless a sound one, and on the whole the discrimination does not seem an unreasonable one.

LIBEL AND SLANDER — PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS — ABUSE OF PRIVILEGE. — A bank depositor requesting blank checks received some with the name of an association faintly stamped above the line for signature. The depositor, oblivious to the stamp, signed and distributed the checks. The bank returned the checks to the payees, with "Forgery" written upon them, and an attached slip marked "Signature Incorrect." The depositor brought action for libel and slander against the bank. *Held*, that he may recover. *Schwartz* v. *Chatham & Phenix National Bank*, 172 N. Y. Supp. 762.

The charge "Forgery" is actionable *per se* as imputing an indictable offense. *Herzog* v. *Campbell*, 47 Neb. 370, 66 N. W. 424. A libellous publication reasonably impressing one as designating the plaintiff renders the defendant liable. *The King* v. *Clerk*, 1 Barn. 304. That the plaintiff is not named by the defendant is immaterial if intrinsic evidence makes apparent the allusion to him. *Van Ingen* v. *Mail & Express Pub. Co.* 156 N. Y. 376, 50 N. E. 979. Accusation of an illegal drawing by the plaintiff on the association's funds is reasonably to be inferred from the charge. Communications between banks and payees of checks drawn thereon, concerning their validity, are, on principle, privileged. *Christopher* v. *Akin*, 214 Mass. 332, 101 N. E. 971; *Rotholz* v. *Dunkle*, 53 N. J. L. 438, 22 Atl. 193. But a privilege exceeded is a privilege lost. *Payne* v. *Rouss*, 61 N. Y. Supp. 705; *Smith* v. *Smith*, 73 Mich. 445, 41 N. W. 499. In the absence of a privilege or where one is exceeded no malice need be shown. POLLOCK, TORTS, 7 ed., 600; 23 HARV. L. REV. 218. The charge "Forgery" in addition to the notification "Signature Incorrect," was